The role of diversity in the evolution of cooperation

被引:158
作者
Santos, Francisco C. [1 ,2 ]
Pinheiro, Flavio L. [1 ]
Lenaerts, Tom [3 ,4 ]
Pacheco, Jorge M. [1 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lisbon, CMAF, ATP Grp, P-1649003 Lisbon, Portugal
[2] Univ Nova Lisboa, Dept Informat & Centria, Fac Ciencias & Tecnol, P-2829516 Caparica, Portugal
[3] Univ Libre Bruxelles, MLG, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
[4] Vrije Univ Brussel, AI Lab, Dept Comp Sci, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
[5] Univ Minho, Dept Matemat & Aplicacoes, P-4710057 Braga, Portugal
关键词
Evolution; Cooperation; Diversity; PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME; SOCIAL DILEMMAS; DYNAMICS; TRAGEDY; EMERGENCE; NETWORKS; PROMOTES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.003
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Understanding the evolutionary mechanisms that promote and maintain cooperative behavior is recognized as a major theoretical problem where the intricacy increases with the complexity of the participating individuals. This is epitomized by the diverse nature of Human interactions, contexts, preferences and social structures. Here we discuss how social diversity, in several of its flavors, catalyzes cooperative behavior. From the diversity in the number of interactions an individual is involved to differences in the choice of role models and contributions, diversity is shown to significantly increase the chances of cooperation. Individual diversity leads to an overall population dynamics in which the underlying dilemma of cooperation is changed, benefiting the society as whole. In addition, we show how diversity in social contexts can arise from the individual capacity for organizing their social ties. As such, Human diversity, on a grand scale, may be instrumental in shaping us as the most sophisticated cooperative entities on this planet. (c) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:88 / 96
页数:9
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