Intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation

被引:44
作者
Anh, Han The [1 ]
Pereira, Luis Moniz [1 ]
Santos, Francisco C. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Nova Lisboa, Fac Ciencias & Tecnol, Dept Informat, Ctr Inteligencia Artificial CENTRIA, P-2829516 Caparica, Portugal
关键词
Evolution of cooperation; intention recognition; Bayesian networks; evolutionary game theory; TIT-FOR-TAT; EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; WIN-STAY; STRATEGY; RULES; GAMES;
D O I
10.1177/1059712311410896
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Few problems have created the combined interest of so many unrelated areas as the evolution of cooperation. As a result, several mechanisms have been identified to work as catalyzers of cooperative behavior. Yet, these studies, mostly grounded on evolutionary dynamics and game theory, have neglected the important role played by intention recognition in behavioral evolution. Here we address explicitly this issue, characterizing the dynamics emerging from a population of intention recognizers. We derive a Bayesian network model for intention recognition in the context of repeated social dilemmas and evolutionary game theory, by assessing the internal dynamics of trust between intention recognizers and their opponents. Intention recognizers are then able to predict the next move of their opponents based on past direct interactions, which, in turn, enables them to prevail over the most famous strategies of repeated dilemmas of cooperation, even in presence of noise. Overall, our framework offers new insights on the complexity and beauty of behavioral evolution driven by elementary forms of cognition.
引用
收藏
页码:264 / 279
页数:16
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