On the Computational Complexity of Non-dictatorial Aggregation

被引:1
作者
Kirousis, Lefteris [1 ]
Kolaitis, Phokion G. [2 ,3 ]
Livieratos, John [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl & Kapodistrian Univ Athens, Dept Math, Athens, Greece
[2] UC Santa Cruz, Comp Sci Dept, Santa Cruz, CA USA
[3] IBM Res Almaden, Santa Cruz, CA USA
来源
RELATIONAL AND ALGEBRAIC METHODS IN COMPUTER SCIENCE | 2018年 / 11194卷
关键词
CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION; DICHOTOMY;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-030-02149-8_21
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
We investigate when non-dictatorial aggregation is possible from an algorithmic perspective, where non-dictatorial aggregation means that the votes cast by the members of a society can be aggregated in such a way that the collective outcome is not simply the choices made by a single member of the society. We consider the setting in which the members of a society take a position on a fixed collection of issues, where for each issue several different alternatives are possible, but the combination of choices must belong to a given set X of allowable voting patterns. Such a set X is called a possibility domain if there is an aggregator that is non-dictatorial, operates separately on each issue, and returns values among those cast by the society on each issue. We design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides, given a set X of voting patterns, whether or not X is a possibility domain. Furthermore, if X is a possibility domain, then the algorithm constructs in polynomial time such a non-dictatorial aggregator for X. We also design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether X is a uniform possibility domain, that is, whether X admits an aggregator that is non-dictatorial even when restricted to any two positions for each issue. As in the case of possibility domains, the algorithm also constructs in polynomial time a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator, if one exists.
引用
收藏
页码:350 / 365
页数:16
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