Solidarity in games with a coalition structure

被引：16

作者：

Calvo, Emilio ^{[1
,2
]}

Gutierrez, Esther ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Valencia, Dept Econ Anal, E-46003 Valencia, Spain

[2] Univ Valencia, ERI CES, E-46003 Valencia, Spain

[3] Univ Basque Country, EHU, Dept Econ Aplicada 4, E-48080 Bilbao, Spain

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2010年 / 60卷 / 03期

关键词：

Games with a coalition structure; Owen value; The two-step Shapley value; Solidarity; AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION; FAIR DIVISION; BANZHAF VALUE; COOPERATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value Kamijo (2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：196 / 203

页数：8

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