Based on complex networks theory and evolutionary game theory, a evolutionary game model on complex networks is proposed and is simulated. The simulation results show that, though ESS is still subject to relative frequencies of initial strategies and payoffs matrix, network structures can change evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Evolutionary game model on complex networks has different performance from general game models. Evolutionary equilibrium is easy to obtain while players are 'stupid' and or else it is hard to obtain.
机构:
Beijing Normal Univ, Inst Econ & Resource Management, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaBeijing Normal Univ, Inst Econ & Resource Management, Beijing, Peoples R China
Ning, Jiajun
Li, Xiyu
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Cent South Univ, Sch Publ Adm, Changsha, Peoples R China
Cent South Univ, Sch Publ Adm, 22 Shaoshan South Rd, Changsha, Peoples R ChinaBeijing Normal Univ, Inst Econ & Resource Management, Beijing, Peoples R China
Li, Xiyu
Gao, Yuan
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Beijing Normal Univ, Inst Econ & Resource Management, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaBeijing Normal Univ, Inst Econ & Resource Management, Beijing, Peoples R China