Evolution Games and the Real Estate Market

被引：0

作者：

Wu Yunna ^{[1
]}

Zhang Yan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] N China Elect Power Univ, Beijing 102206, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF 2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LOGISTICS SYSTEMS AND INTELLIGENT MANAGEMENT, VOLS 1-3 | 2010年

关键词：

Real Estate; Government; Developers; Evolution of the Game;

D O I：

10.1109/BIBMW.2010.5703935

中图分类号：

TH [机械、仪表工业];

学科分类号：

0802 ;

摘要：

Based on the dynamic evolution of game and the limited rationality, the question that why the policy for the game of central real estate and a real estate developers was no work was explored. Based on this discovery, it finds that the abolition of unreasonable fees and the introduction of a unified property tax cannot adjust to the price. The only key is to contain the transferring to the consumers, which makes housing prices return to normal levels. Finally, the suggestion that using lower price to release more funds for the expansion of domestic demand and restricting the sources of speculators' funding are gave to government to regulate and control real estate effectively.

引用

页码：839 / 842

页数：4