Betrayed by the Guardian: Security and Privacy Risks of Parental Control Solutions

被引:10
作者
Ali, Suzan [1 ]
Elgharabawy, Mounir [1 ]
Duchaussoy, Quentin [1 ]
Mannan, Mohammad [1 ]
Youssef, Amr [1 ]
机构
[1] Concordia Univ, Montreal, PQ, Canada
来源
36TH ANNUAL COMPUTER SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE (ACSAC 2020) | 2020年
关键词
Parental control network devices; Android apps; Windows applications; Web extensions; Privacy; Security;
D O I
10.1145/3427228.3427287
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
For parents of young children and adolescents, the digital age has introduced many new challenges, including excessive screen time, inappropriate online content, cyber predators, and cyberbullying. To address these challenges, many parents rely on numerous parental control solutions on different platforms, including parental control network devices (e.g., WiFi routers) and software applications on mobile devices and laptops. While these parental control solutions may help digital parenting, they may also introduce serious security and privacy risks to children and parents, due to their elevated privileges and having access to a significant amount of privacy-sensitive data. In this paper, we present an experimental framework for systematically evaluating security and privacy issues in parental control software and hardware solutions. Using the developed framework, we provide the first comprehensive study of parental control tools on multiple platforms including network devices, Windows applications, Chrome extensions and Android apps. Our analysis uncovers pervasive security and privacy issues that can lead to leakage of private information, and/or allow an adversary to fully control the parental control solution, and thereby may directly aid cyberbullying and cyber predators.
引用
收藏
页码:69 / 83
页数:15
相关论文
共 76 条
  • [1] ACPM, 2016, SSLUNP X POS MOD
  • [2] Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice
    Adrian, David
    Bhargavan, Karthikeyan
    Durumeric, Zakir
    Gaudry, Pierrick
    Green, Matthew
    Halderman, J. Alex
    Heninger, Nadia
    Springall, Drew
    Thome, Emmanuel
    Valenta, Luke
    VanderSloot, Benjamin
    Wustrow, Eric
    Zanella-Beguelin, Santiago
    Zimmermann, Paul
    [J]. CCS'15: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, 2015, : 5 - 17
  • [3] Allison Kendra, 2018, THESIS U S CAROLINA
  • [4] Anderson Collin, 2015, ARE KIDS ALRIGHT DIG
  • [5] Android, ANDR DEV ADM
  • [6] Android, UI APPL EX MONK
  • [7] [Anonymous], 2015, P 2015 ACM SIGCOMM W, DOI DOI 10.1145/2787394
  • [8] Antonakakis M, 2017, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM (USENIX SECURITY '17), P1093
  • [9] Appthority, 2018, APP ENT MOB THREAT R
  • [10] Reliable Third-Party Library Detection in Android and its Security Applications
    Backes, Michael
    Bugiel, Sven
    Derr, Erik
    [J]. CCS'16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, 2016, : 356 - 367