R&D Subsidization Effect and Network Centralization: Evidence from an Agent-Based Micro-Policy Simulation

被引:2
作者
Angelini, Pierpaolo [1 ]
Cerulli, Giovanni [2 ]
Cecconi, Federico [3 ]
Miceli, Maria-Augusta [4 ]
Poti, Bianca [2 ]
机构
[1] Ist Ric Econ & Sociali, Via Santa Teresa 23, I-00198 Rome, Italy
[2] CNR, Res Inst Sustainable Econ Growth, Via Taurini 19, I-00185 Rome, Italy
[3] CNR, Inst Cognit Sci & Technol, Lab Agent Based Social Simulat, Via Palestro 32, I-00185 Rome, Italy
[4] Sapienza Univ Rome, Dept Econ & Law, Via Castro Laurenziano 20, I-00161 Rome, Italy
来源
JASSS-THE JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SIMULATION | 2017年 / 20卷 / 04期
关键词
R&D Policy; Networks; Complexity; Social Simulation; FRAMEWORK; DYNAMICS; COLLABORATION; DISTRIBUTIONS; INNOVATION; EMERGENCE; SUBSIDIES; GROWTH;
D O I
10.18564/jasss.3494
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This paper presents an agent-based micro-policy simulation model assessing public R&D policy effect when R&D and non-R&D performing companies are located within a network. We set out by illustrating the behavioural structure and the computational logic of the proposed model; then, we provide a simulation experiment where the pattern of the total level of R&D activated by a fixed amount of public support is analysed as function of companies' network topology. More specifically, the suggested simulation experiment shows that a larger "hubness" of the network is more likely accompanied with a decreasing median of the aggregated total R&D performance of the system. Since the aggregated firm idiosyncratic R&D (i.e., the part of total R&D independent of spillovers) is slightly increasing, we conclude that positive cross-firm spillover effects - in the presence of a given amount of support - have a sizeable impact within less centralized networks, where fewer hubs emerge. This may question the common wisdom suggesting that larger R&D externality effects should be more likely to arise when few central champions receive a support.
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页数:22
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