Simultaneous Ad Auctions

被引：8

作者：

Ashlagi, Itai ^{[1
]}

Monderer, Dov ^{[2
]}

Tennenholtz, Moshe ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[2] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel

[3] Microsoft Israel R&D Ctr, Herzliyya, Israel

来源：

MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2011年 / 36卷 / 01期

关键词：

ad auctions; competition; revenue; equilibrium; COMPETITION;

D O I：

10.1287/moor.1100.0475

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We consider a model with two simultaneous VCG ad auctions A and B where each advertiser chooses to participate in a single ad auction. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in that model. Moreover, when the click rates in A are pointwise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that this revenue ranking does not hold when advertisers can participate in both auctions.

引用

页码：1 / 13

页数：13

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