CHERI: A Hybrid Capability-System Architecture for Scalable Software Compartmentalization

被引:153
作者
Watson, Robert N. M. [1 ]
Woodruff, Jonathan [1 ]
Neumann, Peter G. [2 ]
Moore, Simon W. [1 ]
Anderson, Jonathan [3 ]
Chisnall, David [1 ]
Dave, Nirav [2 ]
Davis, Brooks [2 ]
Gudka, Khilan [1 ]
Laurie, Ben [4 ]
Murdoch, Steven J. [5 ]
Norton, Robert [1 ]
Roe, Michael [1 ]
Son, Stacey [1 ]
Vadera, Munraj [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1TN, England
[2] SRI Int, Menlo Pk, CA USA
[3] Mem Univ Newfoundland, St John, NF A1C 5S7, Canada
[4] Google UK Ltd, London, England
[5] UCL, London WC1E 6BT, England
来源
2015 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY SP 2015 | 2015年
基金
英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;
关键词
D O I
10.1109/SP.2015.9
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
CHERI extends a conventional RISC Instruction-Set Architecture, compiler, and operating system to support fine-grained, capability-based memory protection to mitigate memory-related vulnerabilities in C-language TCBs. We describe how CHERI capabilities can also underpin a hardware-software object-capability model for application compartmentalization that can mitigate broader classes of attack. Prototyped as an extension to the open-source 64-bit BERI RISC FPGA softcore processor, FreeBSD operating system, and LLVM compiler, we demonstrate multiple orders-of-magnitude improvement in scalability, simplified programmability, and resulting tangible security benefits as compared to compartmentalization based on pure Memory-Management Unit (MMU) designs. We evaluate incrementally deployable CHERI-based compartmentalization using several real-world UNIX libraries and applications.
引用
收藏
页码:20 / 37
页数:18
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