Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction

被引：35

作者：

Bu, Tian-Ming

Deng, Xiaotie

Qi, Qi ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Comp Sci, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[2] Fudan Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Shanghai, Peoples R China

来源：

INFORMATION PROCESSING LETTERS | 2007年 / 105卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

distributed systems; keyword auction; Nash equilibrium;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ipl.2007.07.005

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

We introduce the concept of forward looking Nash equilibrium for the position auction (also called the generalized second price auction), a widely studied protocol for Internet advertisement bidding processes. We show that it has a unique solution for the position auction. Most importantly, the cost each bidder pays and the revenue of the auctioneer under the equilibrium are all equal to those under VCG mechanism. As the position auction is not an incentive compatible protocol, the fact that the forward looking Nash equilibrium results in the same payoff for everyone as in the VCG protocol justifies the practical protocol. (c) 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页码：41 / 46

页数：6