A note on free entry under uncertainty: The role of asymmetric information

被引：2

作者：

Piccolo, Salvatore ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Naples Federico 2, I-80126 Naples, Italy

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2011年 / 111卷 / 03期

关键词：

Asymmetric information; Free entry; Uncertainty; Managerial firms; PRODUCT-MARKET COMPETITION; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; INDUSTRY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.024

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a model of competing managerial firms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to the earlier contributions and is consistent with the available evidence. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：256 / 259

页数：4

共 11 条

[1]

APPLEBAUM E, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P524

[2] Does uncertainty influence the number of firms in an industry? [J].