The financial conservatism of firms in emerging economies

被引:8
作者
Machokoto, Michael [1 ]
Chipeta, Chimwemwe [2 ]
Aftab, Nadeem [1 ]
Areneke, Geofry [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Northampton, Fac Business & Law, Waterside Campus, Northampton NN1 5PH, England
[2] Univ Witwatersrand, Sch Econ & Finance, 1 Jan Smuts Ave, ZA-2000 Johannesburg, South Africa
[3] Manchester Metropolitan Univ, Business Sch, Fac Business & Law, Dept Accounting Finance & Banking, All St Campus,Oxford Rd, Manchester M15 6BH, Lancs, England
关键词
Capital structure; Financial conservatism; Low-leverage; Zero-leverage; Emerging markets; CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS; OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE; ZERO-LEVERAGE; DETERMINANTS; DEBT; DYNAMICS; PERSISTENCE; DIRECTIONS; GOVERNANCE; ADJUSTMENT;
D O I
10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101483
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using a large sample of emerging market firms over the period 1980-2015, we document a high prevalence and persistence of financial conservatism. Specifically, 31% of the African firms have ultra-low leverage (less than 5%), with 42% and 11% having non-positive net-debt (total debt less cash) and no debt (zero-levered), respectively. In further analyses, we find that macroeconomic conditions have a muted effect on financial conservatism. Our results suggest that financial conservatism in emerging markets is due to two main factors; (1) credit constraints, and (2) the desire to attain or enhance financial flexibility. The former calls for pro-market policies that improve access to external finance. At the same time, the latter, which results in the accumulation of cash reserves at the expense of current investments, is a strategic choice aimed at preserving or enhancing financial flexibility. Our results are robust to using alternative sub-sampling, model specifications, definitions of variables and estimation techniques.
引用
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页数:21
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