Screening Peers Softly: Inferring the Quality of Small Borrowers

被引:316
作者
Iyer, Rajkamal [1 ]
Khwaja, Asim Ijaz [2 ]
Luttmer, Erzo F. P. [3 ,4 ]
Shue, Kelly [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Kennedy Sch, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Dartmouth Coll, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
[4] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[5] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60601 USA
关键词
peer-to-peer credit markets; market-based lending; crowd sourcing; screening; market inference; information and hierarchies; soft information; INFORMATION AGGREGATION; RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS; MARKET; PERCOLATION; REVELATION; DISTANCE;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2015.2181
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the performance of new online lending markets that rely on nonexpert individuals to screen their peers' creditworthiness. We find that these peer lenders predict an individual's likelihood of defaulting on a loan with 45% greater accuracy than the borrower's exact credit score (unobserved by the lenders, who only see a credit category). Moreover, peer lenders achieve 87% of the predictive power of an econometrician who observes all standard financial information about borrowers. Screening through soft or nonstandard information is relatively more important when evaluating lower-quality borrowers. Our results highlight how aggregating over the views of peers and leveraging nonstandard information can enhance lending efficiency.
引用
收藏
页码:1554 / 1577
页数:24
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