Family firms, institutional development and earnings quality: does family status complement or substitute for weak institutions?

被引:9
作者
Mengoli, Stefano [1 ]
Pazzaglia, Federica [2 ]
Sandri, Sandro [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bologna, Corp Finance, Via Capo di Lucca 24, Bologna, Italy
[2] Univ Coll Dublin, Coll Business, Dublin, Ireland
关键词
Earnings quality; Family firms; Governance; Institutional development; SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INVESTOR PROTECTION; ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP; MANAGEMENT; PERFORMANCE; PRIVATE; LAW; EXPROPRIATION; STEWARDSHIP;
D O I
10.1007/s10997-019-09466-0
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This study combines insights from the socioemotional wealth perspective and institutional and resource-based theories to examine the earning quality of family and nonfamily firms operating in countries characterized by different levels of institutional development. Results based on a cross-sectional sample of firms from 12 European countries show that family status and a country's level of institutional development are positively related to earnings quality. They also show that institutional development moderates the relationship between family status and earnings quality. Comparing insider-oriented countries that are characterized by lower regulatory and financial development with outsider-oriented countries that are characterized by higher regulatory and financial development, we found that family firms have a higher earnings quality in insider-oriented countries than in outsider-oriented ones. Thus, our study finds support for a substitution effect, whereby family status compensates for the limited capacity of less developed regulations and markets to induce virtuous financial reporting behaviors.
引用
收藏
页码:63 / 90
页数:28
相关论文
共 61 条
[1]   The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: Dimensions and determinants [J].
Aguilera, RV ;
Jackson, G .
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 2003, 28 (03) :447-465
[2]  
Aktas Nihat., 2016, Multinational Finance Journal, V20, P85, DOI [https://doi.org/10.17578/20-2-1, DOI 10.17578/20-2-1]
[3]   Corporate disclosures by family firms [J].
Ali, Ashiq ;
Chen, Tai-Yuan ;
Radhakrishnan, Suresh .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2007, 44 (1-2) :238-286
[4]  
[Anonymous], US IFRS JUR
[5]   The development of organizational social capital: Attributes of family firms [J].
Arregle, Jean-Luc ;
Hitt, Michael A. ;
Sirmon, David G. ;
Very, Philippe .
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, 2007, 44 (01) :73-95
[6]   Do nonaudit services compromise auditor independence? Further evidence [J].
Ashbaugh, H ;
LaFond, R ;
Mayhew, BW .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2003, 78 (03) :611-639
[7]   The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe [J].
Barontini, Roberto ;
Caprio, Lorenzo .
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 2006, 12 (05) :689-723
[8]   Earnings management to avoid earnings declines across publicly and privately held banks [J].
Beatty, AL ;
Ke, B ;
Petroni, KR .
ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2002, 77 (03) :547-570
[9]   Law, endowments, and finance [J].
Beck, T ;
Demirgüç-Kunt, A ;
Levine, R .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2003, 70 (02) :137-181
[10]   Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms: Theoretical Dimensions, Assessment Approaches, and Agenda for Future Research [J].
Berrone, Pascual ;
Cruz, Cristina ;
Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. .
FAMILY BUSINESS REVIEW, 2012, 25 (03) :258-279