A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system

被引：18

作者：

Cai, W. ^{[1
]}

Singham, D. I. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] New Jersey Inst Technol, Dept Mech & Ind Engn, Newark, NJ 07102 USA

[2] Naval Postgrad Sch, Operat Res Dept, Monterey, CA 93943 USA

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH | 2018年 / 264卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Game theory; Mechanism design; Heterogeneous demands; Uncertainty; Carbon capture and storage (CCS); PRODUCT LINE; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; 1ST-ORDER APPROACH; SUPPLY CHAINS; MORAL HAZARD; INCENTIVES; CONTRACTS; INFRASTRUCTURE; SELECTION; BEHAVIOR;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ejor.2017.06.009

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Mechanism design problems optimize contract offerings from a principal to different types of agents who have private information about their demands for a product or a service. We study the implications of uncertainty in agents' demands on the principal's contracts. Specifically, we consider the setting where agents' demands follow heterogeneous distributions and the principal offers a menu of contracts stipulating quantities and transfer payments for each demand distribution. We present analytical solutions for the special case when there are two distributions each taking two discrete values, as well as a method for deriving analytical solutions from numerical solutions. We describe one application of the model in carbon capture and storage systems to demonstrate various types of optimal solutions and to obtain managerial insights. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：239 / 256

页数：18

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