Object defense with preventive strike and false targets

被引:30
作者
Wu, Di [1 ]
Xiao, Hui [2 ]
Peng, Rui [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sci & Technol Beijing, Donlinks Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Stat, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
关键词
Defense; False target; Intentional impact; Optimal strategy; Preventive strike; Vulnerability; SINGLE OBJECT; PROTECTION; ATTACKS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ress.2017.08.006
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
In this paper, optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker are studied. The defender moves first, allocating its limited resources into three diverse measures: launching a preventive strike, building false targets, and protecting the genuine object. It is assumed that launching a preventive strike will expose the genuine object, thus during this measure the defender will not simultaneously build false targets. The attacker moves after observing the actions taken by the defender, allocating its resources into three measures: protecting its own base from a preventive strike, building false bases, and attacking the genuine object. For each of the defender's given strategies, the attacker tries to maximize the destruction probability of the genuine object. Comparing the expected vulnerability of the object, the defender decides whether to launch a preventive strike or build false targets. The strategies of the attacker and the defender are illustrated with numerical examples, and the optimal strategies are found. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:76 / 80
页数:5
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