Optimal pricing and complex analysis for low-carbon apparel supply chains

被引:35
|
作者
Ma, Junhai [1 ]
Wang, Zongxian [1 ]
机构
[1] Tianjin Univ, Coll Management & Econ, Tianjin, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Optimal pricing; Centralized and decentralized models; Static and dynamic game; Stability analysis; Apparel supply chain; GREEN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT; DUOPOLY STACKELBERG GAME; DYNAMICS; STRATEGY; BIFURCATION; STABILITY; INDUSTRY; CHAOS;
D O I
10.1016/j.apm.2022.07.002
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
Motivated by the low-carbon economic development, we study the competition issues in apparel supply chains considering consumers' low-carbon preferences. In this paper, we construct static and dynamic decision-making models under different game scenarios based on the centralized and decentralized frameworks. Firstly, we explore the critical con-version conditions between the centralized and decentralized frameworks with the static game models. The centralized model benefits the whole supply chain when the low-carbon investment coefficient is moderate. On the contrary, the decentralized model benefits the supply chain when the low-carbon investment coefficient is smaller or larger. Secondly, combined with the local and global bifurcation theory, we examine the complex effect of adjustment parameters on the dynamic system. The dynamic game systems show bifurca-tion, chaos, and multi-stability as the adjustment parameters change continuously. There-fore, we apply a hybrid chaos control method to stabilize the dynamic system. Thirdly, we compare the average profits in the dynamic game scenarios and show the complex rela-tionships with the varying parameters. Finally, some management insights and suggestions are presented based on our findings.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:610 / 629
页数:20
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