The Asymmetric Information Problem in Taiwan's Cancer Insurance Market

被引：4

作者：

Wang, Kili C. ^{[1
,2
]}

Peng, Jin-Lung ^{[3
]}

Sun, Yi-Yun ^{[4
]}

Chang, Yao-Chia ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] Tamkang Univ, Dept Insurance, Taipei, Taiwan

[2] Natl Chengchi Univ, Coll Commerce, Risk & Insurance Res Ctr, Taipei 11623, Taiwan

[3] Natl Chengchi Univ, Dept Risk Management & Insurance, Taipei 11623, Taiwan

[4] Shih Chien Univ, Grad Inst Finance & Insurance, Taipei, Taiwan

[5] Tamkang Univ, Grad Inst Finance & Insurance, Taipei, Taiwan

来源：

GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW | 2011年 / 36卷 / 02期

关键词：

asymmetric information; adverse selection; cancer insurance; ADVERSE SELECTION; EQUILIBRIUM; RISK;

D O I：

10.1057/grir.2010.12

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates the problem of asymmetric information in Taiwan's cancer insurance market. Through the survey data, we find evidence of adverse selection existing in this market. Furthermore, we collect additional information on the individual, and find that the individual's family cancer history contains additional valuable information. It can not only more accurately predict the probability of contracting cancer, as well as predict the willingness to purchase extended cancer insurance, but it can also help to mitigate the severity of adverse selection in the insurance market. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review (2011) 36, 202-219. doi: 10.1057/grir.2010.12; published online 15 February 2011

引用

页码：202 / 219

页数：18

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