Water management reform and the choice of contractual form in China

被引：9

作者：

Huang, Qiuqiong ^{[1
]}

Rozelle, Scott ^{[2
]}

Msangi, Siwa ^{[3
]}

Wang, Jinxia ^{[4
]}

Huang, Jikun ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Minnesota, Dept Appl Econ, St Paul, MN 55108 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Freeman Spogli Inst, Shorenstein Asia Pacific Res Ctr, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[3] Int Food Policy Res Inst, Environm & Prod Technol Div, Washington, DC USA

[4] Chinese Acad Sci, Ctr Chines Agr Policy, Inst Geog Sci, Beijing 100864, Peoples R China

来源：

ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS | 2008年 / 13卷

关键词：

D O I：

10.1017/S1355770X07004196

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper explains the puzzling fact that in organizing the management of surface water, village leaders have provided incentives to canal managers in some areas, but not in all. Our study indicates that the optimal contractual choice depends on the relative abilities of the leader and the manager, the design of the cultivated land, the characteristics of the canal system and the opportunity costs of the leader and the pool of managerial candidates. The unifying mechanism is the relative change in the ability of the leader and manager to perform the unmarketable activities that are needed to provide irrigation services.

引用

页码：171 / 200

页数：30