Political connections and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

被引：61

作者：

Luo, Jin-hui ^{[1
]}

Gong, Manning ^{[1
]}

Lin, Yilong ^{[1
]}

Fang, Qifeng ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Xiamen Univ, Sch Management, 422 Siming South Rd, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, Peoples R China

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2016年 / 147卷

关键词：

China; Information environment; Political connections; Stock price crash risk; PRIVATIZED FIRMS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.024

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine how political connections may influence a firm's crash risk in China. We find that politically connected firms have lower crash risk than their counterparts. Moreover, the effect of political connections varies according to their strength and types. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：90 / 92

页数：3

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