Understanding Bank-Run Contagion

被引：44

作者：

Brown, Martin ^{[1
]}

Trautmann, Stefan T. ^{[2
,3
]}

Vlahu, Razvan ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ St Gallen, CH-9000 St Gallen, Switzerland

[2] Heidelberg Univ, Alfred Weber Inst Econ, D-69115 Heidelberg, Germany

[3] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, NL-5037 AB Tilburg, Netherlands

[4] DNB, NL-1000 AB Amsterdam, Netherlands

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2017年 / 63卷 / 07期

关键词：

contagion; bank runs; systemic risk; asset commonality; DEPOSIT INSURANCE; LOSS-AVOIDANCE; COORDINATION; INFORMATION; PANICS; RISK; FAILURES;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.2015.2416

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We study experimental coordination games to examine through which transmission channels and under which information conditions a panic-based depositor run at one bank may trigger a panic-based depositor run at another bank. We find that withdrawals at one bank trigger withdrawals at another bank by increasing players' beliefs that other depositors in their own bank will withdraw, making them more likely to withdraw as well. Observed withdrawals only affect depositors' beliefs, and are thus contagious when they form an informative signal about bank fundamentals.

引用

页码：2272 / 2282

页数：11

共 56 条

[1] Information contagion and bank herding [J].