On the relation among some definitions of strategic stability

被引:11
作者
Hillas, J
Jansen, M
Potters, J
Vermeulen, D
机构
[1] Univ Auckland, Dept Econ, Auckland 1, New Zealand
[2] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
[3] Univ Nymegan, Dept Math, NL-6525 ED Nijmegen, Netherlands
关键词
game theory; strategic stability;
D O I
10.1287/moor.26.3.611.10585
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
In this paper we examine a number of different definitions of strategic stability and the relations among them. In particular, we show that the stability requirement given by Hillas (1990) is weaker than the requirements involved in the various definitions of stability in Mertens' reformulation of stability (Mertens 1989, 1991). To this end, we introduce a new definition of stability and show that it is equivalent to (a variant of) the definition given by Hillas (1990). We also use the equivalence of our new definition with the definition of Hillas to provide correct proofs of some of the results that were originally claimed (and incorrectly "proved") in Hillas (1990).
引用
收藏
页码:611 / 635
页数:25
相关论文
共 21 条
[1]   EVERY STABLE SET CONTAINS A FULLY STABLE SET [J].
GOVINDAN, S .
ECONOMETRICA, 1995, 63 (01) :191-193
[2]   ON THE DEFINITION OF THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA [J].
HILLAS, J .
ECONOMETRICA, 1990, 58 (06) :1365-1390
[3]  
HILLAS J, 1997, RES MEMORANDUM
[4]  
HILLAS J, 1994, HDB GAME THEORY EC A, V3
[5]  
Kakutani S, 1941, Duke Mathematical Journal, V8, P457, DOI DOI 10.1215/S0012-7094-41-00838-4
[6]   ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA [J].
KOHLBERG, E ;
MERTENS, JF .
ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (05) :1003-1037
[7]   How proper is sequential equilibrium? [J].
Mailath, GJ ;
Samuelson, L ;
Swinkels, JM .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1997, 18 (02) :193-218
[8]   FIXED-POINTS OF CONTRACTIBLE VALUED CORRESPONDENCES [J].
MCLENNAN, A .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1989, 18 (02) :175-184
[9]   CONSISTENT CONDITIONAL SYSTEMS IN NONCOOPERATIVE GAME-THEORY [J].
MCLENNAN, A .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1989, 18 (02) :141-174