Government Initiated Corporate Social Responsibility Activities: Evidence from a Poverty Alleviation Campaign in China
被引:78
作者:
Chang, Yuyuan
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Dept Accounting & Finance, Xian, Peoples R ChinaXi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Dept Accounting & Finance, Xian, Peoples R China
Chang, Yuyuan
[1
]
He, Wen
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Monash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Dept Accounting, Melbourne, Vic, AustraliaXi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Dept Accounting & Finance, Xian, Peoples R China
He, Wen
[2
]
Wang, Jianling
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Dept Accounting & Finance, Xian, Peoples R ChinaXi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Dept Accounting & Finance, Xian, Peoples R China
Wang, Jianling
[1
]
机构:
[1] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Management, Dept Accounting & Finance, Xian, Peoples R China
[2] Monash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Dept Accounting, Melbourne, Vic, Australia
Corporate social responsibility;
Incentives;
Government;
Poverty alleviation;
China;
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY;
INCENTIVES;
HEALTH;
POLICY;
CSR;
PHILANTHROPY;
PERFORMANCE;
LEADERSHIP;
WEALTH;
COSTS;
D O I:
10.1007/s10551-020-04538-w
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
In 2016 the Chinese government initiated a nationwide campaign aiming to eliminate poverty in China by 2020. Over 20% of listed firms in China have made significant contributions to the campaign. Using hand-collected data on listed firms' contributions to the campaign and multivariate analyses, we examine whether managers' and politicians' personal incentives play an important role in firms' contributions to the campaign. The results show that firms are more likely to contribute if they are state-owned and managers are appointed by governments, if managers have a higher risk of being targeted in a concurrent anti-corruption campaign, if the political leaders in their province are new or intend to seek promotion, and if managers or directors have experienced poverty in their early life. The results suggest that it is important to consider managers' and politicians' personal incentives in CSR activities that could have a grand social impact.