Taking the road less traveled by: Does conversation eradicate pernicious cascades?

被引：18

作者：

Cao, H. Henry ^{[2
]}

Han, Bing ^{[3
,4
]}

Hirshleifer, David ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Irvine, Merage Sch Business, Irvine, CA 92697 USA

[2] Cheung Kong Grad Sch Business, Beijing, Peoples R China

[3] Univ Texas Austin, McCombs Sch Business, Austin, TX 78712 USA

[4] Peking Univ, Guanghua Sch Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2011年 / 146卷 / 04期

关键词：

Information cascades; Network communications; Long-run efficiency; WORD-OF-MOUTH; INFORMATIONAL CASCADES; HERD BEHAVIOR; CONFORMITY; MODEL; FADS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.010

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We offer a model in which sequences of individuals often converge upon poor decisions and are prone to fads, despite communication of the payoff outcomes from past choices. This reflects both direct and indirect action-based information externalities. In contrast with previous cascades literature, cascades here are spontaneously dislodged and in general have a probability less than one of lasting forever. Furthermore, the ability of individuals to communicate can reduce average decision accuracy and welfare. Published by Elsevier Inc.

引用

页码：1418 / 1436

页数：19

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