Attack Detection in Power Distribution Systems Using a Cyber-Physical Real-Time Reference Model

被引:21
作者
Khan, Mohammed Masum Siraj [1 ]
Giraldo, Jairo A. [1 ]
Parvania, Masood [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Utah, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA
关键词
Power distribution; Real-time systems; Customer relationship management; Data models; Load modeling; Cyberattack; Relays; Attack detection; cyber-physical system; real-time reference model; online power system analysis; FALSE DATA INJECTION; STATE ESTIMATION; DIGITAL TWIN; RESILIENCY; DEFENSE;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2021.3128034
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
This paper develops a novel intrusion detection system for power distribution systems that utilizes a cyber-physical real-time reference model to accurately replicate the complex behavior of power distribution components for attack detection. The proposed intrusion detection system analyzes the consistency of the physical data from sensor readings and control commands in contrast with their digital counterpart obtained from the real-time reference model. Therefore, a residual-based online attack detection mechanism that utilizes the chi-square test is able to determine the presence of malicious data. The proposed mechanism is implemented on a hardware-in-the-loop simulation testbed on a test power distribution system with distributed energy resources and energy storage systems. The results show that the proposed solution is able to quickly detect multiple types of cyber attacks for different levels of accuracy of the real-time reference model. The simulations illustrate that the proposed approach outperforms conventional attack detection mechanisms such as one-class classifiers and residual-based approaches that utilize Kalman filters or neural networks.
引用
收藏
页码:1490 / 1499
页数:10
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