Is relationship lending special? Evidence from credit-file data in Germany

被引:239
作者
Elsas, R
Krahnen, JP
机构
[1] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, Inst Kapitalmarktforsch, Ctr Financial Studies, D-60329 Frankfurt, Germany
[2] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, D-60054 Frankfurt, Germany
关键词
relationship lending; housebanks; loan price determination; credit volume;
D O I
10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00063-6
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The German financial market is often characterized as a bank-based system with strong bank-customer relationships. The corresponding notion of a housebank is closely related to the theoretical idea of relationship lending. It is the objective of this paper to provide a direct comparison between housebanks and "normal" banks as to their credit policy. Therefore, we analyze a new data set, representing a random sample of borrowers drawn from the credit portfolios of five leading German banks over a period of five years. We use credit-file data rather than industry survey data and, thus, focus the analysis on information that is directly related to actual credit decisions. In particular, we use bank-internal borrower rating data to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status to control for information-intensive relationships. The major results of our study support the view that housebanks are able to establish a distinct behavioral pattern consistent with the idea of long-term commitment. We find that housebanks do provide liquidity insurance in situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings. With respect to loan pricing, we find no evidence for intra- or intertemporal price differentiation related to house banking. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1283 / 1316
页数:34
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