Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies

被引：13
作者：
Sun, Yeneng
Yannelis, Nicholas C. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Illinois, Dept Econ, Champaign, IL 61820 USA
[2] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ & Math, Singapore 117570, Singapore
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2007年 / 61卷 / 01期
关键词：
asymmetric information; core; Pareto efficiency; Walrasian allocation; incentive compatibility; negligible private information;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider a perfectly competitive ex ante economy with a continuum of agents and negligible asymmetric information. For such an economy we recast the basic classical results on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, core equivalence, and the blocking size of coalitions. Moreover, we examine the incentive compatibility of the ex ante Pareto, core and Walrasian allocations. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：131 / 155
页数：25
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