The role of threats in animal cooperation

被引:72
作者
Cant, Michael A. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Exeter, Ctr Ecol & Conservat, Penryn TR10 9EZ, Cornwall, England
基金
英国自然环境研究理事会;
关键词
negotiation; within-group conflict; reproductive skew; mutualism; biparental care; cooperative breeding; TUG-OF-WAR; REPRODUCTIVE SKEW; CONFLICT-RESOLUTION; CLEANER FISH; HELPERS PAY; EVOLUTION; PARENT; PUNISHMENT; BEHAVIOR; RECIPROCITY;
D O I
10.1098/rspb.2010.1241
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
In human societies, social behaviour is strongly influenced by threats of punishment, even though the threats themselves rarely need to be exercised. Recent experimental evidence suggests that similar hidden threats can promote cooperation and limit within-group selfishness in some animal systems. In other animals, however, threats appear to be ineffective. Here I review theoretical and empirical studies that help to understand the evolutionary causes of these contrasting patterns, and identify three factors-impact, accuracy and perception-that together determine the effectiveness of threats to induce cooperation.
引用
收藏
页码:170 / 178
页数:9
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