Interpreting Kant's Idea of Autonomy from Perspective of Choice

被引:0
|
作者
Liu, Feng-juan [1 ]
机构
[1] Jiangsu Normal Univ, Sch Philosophy & Publ Adm, Xuzhou, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
来源
UNIVERSITAS-MONTHLY REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE | 2017年 / 44卷 / 08期
关键词
Kant; Autonomy; Choice; Maxim; Finite Holy Beings; Example;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Kant's idea of autonomy has always been interpreted from two aspects, lawgiving of pure will and executing of choice. Although the way of thinking reveals significance of autonomy beyond its faculty of lawgiving, it doesn't show any internal unity between the pure will and the choice, nor proves any genuine meaning of subjective maxim in lawgiving. Contemporary scholars pay more attention to individual dimension of the choice, and by so doing an implicit perspective of Kant's theory of freedom also emerges, i.e., from the actual faculty of choice to the idea of pure will. Spirit of Kant's idea of autonomy lies not just in the moral lawgiving of pure reason, but also in the subjective maxims which can be voluntarily taken as universal laws by human will. So, in the choice's own executing behaviors there is already the meaning of lawgiving which is embodied in its self-promotion to becoming holy. For the crux of the self-promotion consists in its following finite holy beings who act as the third thing between abstract perfect will and human subjective maxims, and can have effects on their inner maxims only as examples.
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页码:39 / 53
页数:15
相关论文
共 5 条
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