A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement

被引：9

作者：

Bracco, Emanuele ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Lancaster, Sch Management, Dept Econ, Lancaster LA1 4XY, England

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2018年 / 164卷

关键词：

Political budget cycle; Parking tickets; Tax collection;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection - other than tax setting - can be strategically used to affect electoral results. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：117 / 120

页数：4

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