CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud

被引：530

作者：

Khanna, Vikramaditya ^{[1
]}

Kim, E. Han ^{[2
]}

Lu, Yao ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Michigan, Sch Law, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

[2] Univ Michigan, Ross Sch Business, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

[3] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2015年 / 70卷 / 03期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

MERITS MATTER; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; ANALYST COVERAGE; SECURITIES FRAUD; MANAGERS; BOARD; PAY; COMPENSATION; PERFORMANCE; GOVERNANCE;

D O I：

10.1111/jofi.12243

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment-based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases the expected costs of fraud by helping conceal fraudulent activity, making CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out illegal activity. Connections based on network ties through past employment, education, or social organization memberships have insignificant effects on fraud. Appointment-based CEO connectedness warrants attention from regulators, investors, and corporate governance specialists.

引用

页码：1203 / 1252

页数：50

共 76 条

[1] Corporate governance and accounting scandals [J].