A different approach to safety in emergency medicine

[1] The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems [J]. SAFETY SCIENCE, 2001, 37 (2-3) : 109 - 126

[2] An alternative strategy for studying adverse events in medical care [J]. LANCET, 1997, 349 (9048) : 309 - 313

[3] [Anonymous], 2000, FRIENDLY FIRE ACCIDE

[4] BLANCHARD RE, HUMAN ERROR SHOULD 2

[5] BLANCHARD RE, HUMAN ERROR SHOULD 1

[6] Bourrier M., 2002, CARE, V10, P173, DOI [10.1111/1468, DOI 10.1016/J]

[7] EFFECT OF OUTCOME ON PHYSICIAN JUDGMENTS OF APPROPRIATENESS OF CARE [J]. JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 1991, 265 (15): : 1957 - 1960

[8] Complex learning: organizational learning from disasters [J]. SAFETY SCIENCE, 2001, 39 (1-2) : 61 - 70

[9] Prosaic organizational failure [J]. AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, 1996, 39 (08) : 1040 - 1056

[10] Clarke L.B., 1999, Mission improbable

[1] The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems [J]. SAFETY SCIENCE, 2001, 37 (2-3) : 109 - 126

[2] An alternative strategy for studying adverse events in medical care [J]. LANCET, 1997, 349 (9048) : 309 - 313

[3] [Anonymous], 2000, FRIENDLY FIRE ACCIDE

[4] BLANCHARD RE, HUMAN ERROR SHOULD 2

[5] BLANCHARD RE, HUMAN ERROR SHOULD 1

[6] Bourrier M., 2002, CARE, V10, P173, DOI [10.1111/1468, DOI 10.1016/J]

[7] EFFECT OF OUTCOME ON PHYSICIAN JUDGMENTS OF APPROPRIATENESS OF CARE [J]. JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 1991, 265 (15): : 1957 - 1960

[8] Complex learning: organizational learning from disasters [J]. SAFETY SCIENCE, 2001, 39 (1-2) : 61 - 70

[9] Prosaic organizational failure [J]. AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, 1996, 39 (08) : 1040 - 1056

[10] Clarke L.B., 1999, Mission improbable