Double-counting and the problem of the many

被引：2

作者：

Liebesman, David ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calgary, Dept Philosophy, 2500 Univ Dr NW, Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2021年 / 178卷 / 01期

关键词：

Problem of the many; Quantifier domain restriction; Nominal restriction; Double-counting; Semantics of counting; Pragmatics of counting;

D O I：

10.1007/s11098-020-01428-9

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

There is a defeasible constraint against double counting. When I count colours, for instance, I can't freely count both a color and its shades. Once we properly grasp this constraint, we can solve the problem of the many. Unlike other solutions, this solution requires us to reject neither our counting judgments, nor the metaphysical principles that seemingly conflict with them. The key is recognizing that the judgments and principles are compatible due to the targeted effects of the defeasible constraint.

引用

页码：209 / 234

页数：26