Mahakashyapa's Smile: Language, Silence, and Mysticism

This paper critically examines whether, and how, mystical insights can be conveyed in language. First, the problem of mystical ineffability is briefly presented: how, if at all, is it possible to express the supposedly transrational and transconceptual (non-dualistic) mystical experience in rational and conceptual (dualistic) linguistic terms? Second, drawing on the Wittgensteinian distinction between "pointing" and "saying", it is demonstrated that language not only speaks (describes), but also acts (performs). In this sense, it is wrong to interpret mystical utterances as discursive utterances, because they do not refer to the mystical, but enact it. Yet unlike ordinary (negative or positive) performatives, which remain embedded in the conceptual framework, mystical utterances function as absolute negative performatives, i.e. as instances of radical de-conceptualisation. Finally, several means for expressing the inexpressible are outlined: two non-linguistic (silence and bodily act), and four linguistic (evocative non-sense, paradox, negation, and scriptural metaphor). The individual expressive forms are classified according to two mutually exclusive criteria: the criterion of consistency discloses whether, and to what extent, a given form is compatible with the original mystical experience, while the criterion of suggestivity shows how successful a given form is in addressing its recipient. It is argued that the two criteria form an elementary matrix for a better understanding of how mystical experience, despite its fundamental transrationality, can be coherently expressed in language.