COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION AND PRO-SOCIAL EMOTIONS TO ENHANCE COOPERATION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM FISHING COMMUNITIES IN COLOMBIA

被引:57
作者
Claudia Lopez, Maria [1 ]
Murphy, James J. [2 ,3 ]
Spraggon, John M. [3 ]
Stranlund, John K. [3 ]
机构
[1] Pontificia Univ Javeriana Bogota, Sch Environm & Rural Studies, Bogota, Colombia
[2] Univ Alaska Anchorage, Chair Econ, Dept Econ, Anchorage, AK 99508 USA
[3] Univ Massachusetts, Dept Resource Econ, Amherst, MA 01003 USA
关键词
COLLECTIVE ACTION; ECONOMIC-THEORY; PUBLIC GOOD; PUNISHMENT; EXCHANGE; MONETARY; WORLD; NORMS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00344.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper presents the results from a series of framed field experiments conducted in fishing communities off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The goal is to investigate the relative effectiveness of exogenous regulatory pressure and pro-social emotions in promoting cooperative behavior in a public goods context. The random public revelation of an individual's contribution and its consequences for the rest of the group leads to significantly higher public good contributions and social welfare than regulatory pressure, even under regulations that are designed to motivate fully efficient contributions. (JEL C93, H41, Q20, Q28)
引用
收藏
页码:131 / 142
页数:12
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