Price-sensitive demand and market entry

被引:4
作者
Gu, Yiquan [1 ]
Rasch, Alexander [2 ]
Wenzel, Tobias [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Liverpool, Sch Management, Chatham St, Liverpool L69 7ZH, Merseyside, England
[2] Univ Dusseldorf, DICE, Univ Str 1, D-40225 Dusseldorf, Germany
[3] Univ Bath, Dept Econ, Bath BA2 7AY, Avon, England
关键词
L11; L13; Circular city; horizontal product differentiation; market entry; price-sensitive demand; MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; ELASTIC DEMAND; HOTELLING MODEL; DISCRIMINATION; DIFFERENTIATION; STABILITY; WELFARE; THEOREM; COSTS;
D O I
10.1111/pirs.12165
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper revisits the optimal entry decision in a differentiated product market where customer demand is price-sensitive and depends on a per-unit transport cost. We show that compared to the socially optimal outcome, too few firms may enter when entry costs and transport costs are high.
引用
收藏
页码:865 / +
页数:12
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