Alethic functionalism and our folk theory of truth

被引：19

作者：

Lynch, MP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Connecticut, Dept Philosophy, Storrs, CT 06269 USA

来源：

SYNTHESE | 2005年 / 145卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s11229-004-1771-2

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the view's main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes "true" as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.

引用

页码：29 / 43

页数：15

共 22 条

[1]

[Anonymous], PHILOS PERSPECTIVES

[2]

[Anonymous], NATURE TRUTH

[3]

[Anonymous], 1998, TRUTH CONTEXT

[4]

[Anonymous], SAVING DIFFERENCES

[5] On mixed inferences and pluralism about truth predicates (Reply to Christine Tappolet) [J].

Beall, JC .

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 2000, 50 (200) :380-382

[6]

Block Ned, 1980, Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, P216, DOI DOI 10.2307/2183914

[7]

Boghossian P.A., 1997, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language

[8]

Crispin Wright, 2001, NATURE TRUTH CLASSIC, P751

[9]

Devitt Micheal., 1997, REALISM TRUTH, V2nd

[10]

Field H., 1972, J PHILOS, V69, P347, DOI [10.2307/2024879, DOI 10.2307/2024879]

← 1 2 3 →