Bringing the market inside the firm?

被引：80

作者：

Baker, G

Gibbons, R

Murphy, KJ

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Boston, MA 02163 USA

[2] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[3] Univ So Calif, Marshall Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2001年 / 91卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.91.2.212

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：212 / 218

页数：7

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