The benefits of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games

被引：105

作者：

Rivas, M. Fernanda ^{[1
]}

Sutter, Matthias ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Middle E Tech Univ, TR-10 Trnc, Mersin, Turkey

[2] Univ Innsbruck, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria

[3] Univ Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2011年 / 112卷 / 02期

关键词：

Public goods; Experiment; Voluntary leadership;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2011.04.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the effects of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games when each group member can volunteer to contribute before the other members. We find that voluntary leadership increases contributions significantly, compared to a treatment where leadership is enforced exogenously. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：176 / 178

页数：3

共 6 条

[1] z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments [J].