Optimal Property Rights in Financial Contracting

被引:21
作者
Ayotte, Kenneth [1 ]
Bolton, Patrick [2 ]
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Sch Law, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
关键词
K11; K12; G32; G33; LIABILITY RULES; SECURED CLAIMS; LAW; LEGAL; BANKRUPTCY; OWNERSHIP; PRIORITY; PRIVATE; COSTS;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhr053
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article adopts a definition of property rights from legal scholarship: A property right (in contrast to a contractual right) is enforceable, not only against the parties to a contract, but also against third parties outside the contract. In a financial contracting setting, we ask: When should the law enforce a lender's contractual protections as property rights, given that these rights may be hidden and costly for other lenders to discover? Our model explains why the law limits the creation and enforceability of property rights, and develops principles of optimal enforceability. These principles are often reflected in the law.
引用
收藏
页码:3401 / 3433
页数:33
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