When moving without volition: Implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects

被引:51
作者
Dogge, Myrthel [1 ]
Schaap, Marloes [1 ]
Custers, Ruud [1 ]
Wegner, Daniel M. [2 ]
Aarts, Henk [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Utrecht, Dept Psychol, NL-3508 TC Utrecht, Netherlands
[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Psychol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
Voluntary vs. involuntary movement; Agency; Intentional binding; Implied self-causation; Inferential processes; AWARENESS; AGENCY; EXPERIENCE; AUTHORSHIP; INFERENCE; BELIEFS;
D O I
10.1016/j.concog.2011.10.014
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The conscious awareness of voluntary action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between actions and outcomes is experienced as compressed in time. Although this temporal binding is thought to result from voluntary movement and provides a window to the sense of agency, recent studies challenge this idea by demonstrating binding in involuntary movement. We offer a potential account for these findings by proposing that binding between involuntary actions and effects can occur when self-causation is implied. Participants made temporal judgements concerning a key press and a tone, while they learned to consider themselves as the cause of the effect or not. Results showed that implied self-causation (vs. no implied self-causation) increased temporal binding. Since intrinsic motor cues of movement were absent, these results suggest that sensory evidence about the key press caused binding in retrospect and in line with the participant's sense of being an agent. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:501 / 506
页数:6
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