Quantitative Measurement and Design of Source-Location Privacy Schemes for Wireless Sensor Networks

被引:55
作者
Li, Yun [1 ]
Ren, Jian [2 ]
Wu, Jie [3 ]
机构
[1] Microsoft Corp, Redmond, WA 98052 USA
[2] Michigan State Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA
[3] Temple Univ, Dept Comp & Informat Sci, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Source-location privacy; source-location information leakage; quantitative measurement; wireless sensor networks (WSNs);
D O I
10.1109/TPDS.2011.260
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been widely used in many areas for critical infrastructure monitoring and information collection. While confidentiality of the message can be ensured through content encryption, it is much more difficult to adequately address source-location privacy (SLP). For WSNs, SLP service is further complicated by the nature that the sensor nodes generally consist of low-cost and low-power radio devices. Computationally intensive cryptographic algorithms (such as public-key cryptosystems), and large scale broadcasting-based protocols may not be suitable. In this paper, we first propose criteria to quantitatively measure source-location information leakage in routing-based SLP protection schemes for WSNs. Through this model, we identify vulnerabilities of some well-known SLP protection schemes. We then propose a scheme to provide SLP through routing to a randomly selected intermediate node (RSIN) and a network mixing ring (NMR). Our security analysis, based on the proposed criteria, shows that the proposed scheme can provide excellent SLP. The comprehensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme is very efficient and can achieve a high message delivery ratio. We believe it can be used in many practical applications.
引用
收藏
页码:1302 / 1311
页数:10
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