SEC enforcement: Does forthright disclosure and cooperation really matter?

被引：72

作者：

Files, Rebecca ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas Dallas, Sch Management, Richardson, TX 75080 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 53卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

SEC enforcement actions; AAERs; Accounting restatements; Cooperation; Voluntary disclosure; EQUITY INCENTIVES; MARKET; CONSEQUENCES; RESTATEMENTS; DETERMINANTS; EARNINGS; RETURNS; FRAUD; FIRMS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.06.006

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study examines the conditions under which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercises enforcement leniency following a restatement. I explore whether cooperation with SEC staff and forthright disclosure of a restatement (e.g., disclosures reported in a timely and visible manner) reduce the likelihood of an SEC sanction or SEC monetary penalties. After controlling for restatement severity, I find that cooperation increases the likelihood of being sanctioned, perhaps because it improves the SEC's ability to build a successful case against the firm. However, cooperation and forthright disclosures are rewarded by the SEC through lower monetary penalties. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：353 / 374

页数：22