Research on the Influence of Network Position on Corporate Social Responsibility: Moderating Effect Based on Ownership Concentration

被引:3
作者
Qu, Liang [1 ]
Xu, Yuanjie [1 ]
Guo, Yajing [1 ]
机构
[1] Zhejiang Gongshang Univ, Sch Business Adm, Hangzhou, Peoples R China
关键词
interlocking directorate network; centrality; structural hole; corporate social responsibility (CSR); ownership concentration; BOARD INTERLOCKS; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS; SMALL WORLD; DIFFUSION; FIRMS; MANAGEMENT; CENTRALITY; IMPACT; MATTER;
D O I
10.3389/fpsyg.2022.894725
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Based on the social network theory and the institutional theory, this study examines the influence of corporate network position on corporate social responsibility (CSR), and further explores the moderating role of ownership concentration. Given the characteristics of CSR in different aspects, this study explores the relationship between corporate network position and economic CSR, environmental CSR, and social CSR from the two aspects of the centrality and structural holes of interlocking directorate network based on the data of 1,034 Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019. The results show that the centrality and structural holes of interlocking directorate network have positive effects on the overall level of CSR, and the impacts on economic CSR and environmental CSR are stronger than that on social CSR. In addition, ownership concentration has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between corporate network position and CSR. These findings enrich the depth of research on CSR, clarify the influence of the characteristics of interlocking directorate network on CSR in different dimensions, and supplement the knowledge of existing research.
引用
收藏
页数:15
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