Labor supply response to overpayment notifications: Evidence from Social Security Disability Insurance

被引:1
作者
Anand, Priyanka [1 ]
Hoffman, Denise [2 ]
Jones, John T. [3 ]
Lukashanets, Siarhei [2 ]
机构
[1] George Mason Univ, Dept Hlth Adm & Policy, 4400 Univ Dr,MS 1J3, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
[2] Mathematica, Washington, DC USA
[3] Social Secur Adm, Baltimore, MD USA
关键词
earnings; employment; overpayments; Social Security Disability Insurance;
D O I
10.1111/coep.12561
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We use administrative data to provide evidence that notification of work-related overpayment debt reduces subsequent work activity by Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries. We exploit randomness in the timing of the overpayment debt notification by comparing beneficiary work activity before and after notification. Our results show that the share of overpaid beneficiaries engaging in substantial work activity declined by 8% over the 2-month period following an overpayment notification, which reduced to 4% after accounting for the ongoing declining trend in work activity. This evidence that overpayment debt notification discourages work highlights the need for policies to curtail overpayments.
引用
收藏
页码:304 / 322
页数:19
相关论文
共 22 条
  • [1] Pathways Taken by New Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income Awardees
    Anand, Priyanka
    Ben-Shalom, Yonatan
    [J]. JOURNAL OF DISABILITY POLICY STUDIES, 2018, 29 (03) : 153 - 165
  • [2] [Anonymous], 2011, GAO PUBL
  • [3] Croake S., 2015, BOND IMPLEMENTATION
  • [4] Croake S., 2018, BOND IMPLEMENTATION, P1
  • [5] Greenstein R., 2019, REDUCING OVERPAYMENT
  • [6] Hoffman D., 2020, OVERPAYMENTS TIME LO
  • [7] Hoffman D., 2019, SOC SEC B, V79, P65
  • [8] Jones, 2017, 2016 STAGE 1 INTERIM
  • [9] Kregel J., 2018, QUALITATIVE STUDY EM
  • [10] Livermore Gina A, 2011, Soc Secur Bull, V71, P61