Deception: The role of consequences

[31] *INS RES COUNC, 1991, PUBL ATT MON

[32] KAHNEMAN D, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P728

[33] Kant Immanuel., 1949, CRITIQUE PRACTICAL R, P346

[34] KIRCHSTEIGER G, 1992, THESIS U VIENNA

[35] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279

[36] Lewicki RJ, 1983, Negotiating in organizations, P68

[37] The Costs of Deception: Evidence from Psychology [J]. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2002, 5 (02) : 111 - 131

[38] Curtailing deception: The impact of direct questions on lies and omissions [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, 1999, 10 (03) : 225 - 248

[39] SCHWEITZER ME, 2003, WHARTON DECISION MAK, P187

[40] STRAHLBERG D, 2001, CHICAGO BUSINES 1105

[31] *INS RES COUNC, 1991, PUBL ATT MON

[32] KAHNEMAN D, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P728

[33] Kant Immanuel., 1949, CRITIQUE PRACTICAL R, P346

[34] KIRCHSTEIGER G, 1992, THESIS U VIENNA

[35] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279

[36] Lewicki RJ, 1983, Negotiating in organizations, P68

[37] The Costs of Deception: Evidence from Psychology [J]. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2002, 5 (02) : 111 - 131

[38] Curtailing deception: The impact of direct questions on lies and omissions [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, 1999, 10 (03) : 225 - 248

[39] SCHWEITZER ME, 2003, WHARTON DECISION MAK, P187

[40] STRAHLBERG D, 2001, CHICAGO BUSINES 1105