Interest Group Activists and the Polarization of State Legislatures

被引:15
作者
Grumbach, Jacob M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Ctr Study Democract Polit, 223 Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
TESTING THEORIES; SOCIAL-POLICY; AMERICAN; POLITICS; NOMINATIONS; DEMOCRACY;
D O I
10.1111/lsq.12244
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Theories in campaign finance research suggest that interest group contributions moderate, and individual contributions polarize, state legislators. However, interest groups are comprised of individuals, and public opinion data suggest that group-affiliated individual donors are more politically active and have especially extreme attitudes. This article investigates the relationship between group-affiliated donors and legislative polarization in the U.S. states. In recent elections, individual contributors have grown more closely affiliated with activist organizations, such as environmental and anti-abortion groups. Contributions from these group-affiliated contributors predict legislative extremism at least as well as overall contributions from interest groups, individual donors, party committees, and party-affiliated individuals. Using a novel data set of state legislative primary dates, results suggest that this relationship may be concentrated in the nomination process. Although the potential for endogeneity merits caution, the findings complicate theoretical firewalls between organizations and individuals in research on parties, interest groups, and campaign finance.
引用
收藏
页码:5 / 34
页数:30
相关论文
共 55 条
[1]  
Achen CH., 2017, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1965, LOGIC COLLECTIVE ACT
[3]   Why is there so little money in US politics? [J].
Ansolabehere, S ;
de Figueiredo, JM ;
Snyder, JM .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 2003, 17 (01) :105-130
[4]   More Democracy: The Direct Primary and Competition in U.S. Elections [J].
Ansolabehere, Stephen ;
Hansen, John Mark ;
Hirano, Shigeo ;
Snyder, James M., Jr. .
STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 2010, 24 (02) :190-205
[5]  
Ansolabehere Stephen., 2014, Cumulative CCES Common Content (2006-2012)
[6]   Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups [J].
Anzia, Sarah F. .
JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 2011, 73 (02) :412-427
[7]   Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology [J].
Barber, Michael .
POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, 2016, 69 (01) :148-159
[8]   Ideologically Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance? [J].
Barber, Michael J. ;
Canes-Wrone, Brandice ;
Thrower, Sharece .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2017, 61 (02) :271-288
[9]   Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of American Legislatures [J].
Barber, Michael J. .
JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 2016, 78 (01) :296-310
[10]  
Bartels L.M., 2009, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY PO