What the metasemantics of know is not

Epistemic contextualism in the style of Lewis (in Aust J Philos 74:549-567, 1996) maintains that ascriptions of knowledge to a subject vary in truth with the alternatives that can be eliminated by the subject's evidence in a context. Schaffer (in Philos Stud 119:73-103, 2004, in Oxford Stud Epistemol 1:235-271, 2005, in Philos Phenomenol Res 75:383-403, 2007, in Philos Issues 18(1):1-19, 2008, in: Schaffer, Loewer (eds) A companion to David Lewis, pp 473-490. Wiley, Hoboken, 2015), Schaffer and Knobe (in Nous 46:675-708, 2012), and Schaffer and Szabo (in Philos Stud 168(2):491-543, 2014) hold that the question under discussion or qud always determines these alternatives in a context. This paper shows that the qud does not perform such a role for know and uses this result to draw a few lessons about the metasemantics of context-sensitivity.