Evolution and information in a gift-giving game

被引：20

作者：

Johnson, P ^{[1
]}

Levine, DK

Pesendorfer, W

机构：

[1] Inst Technol Autonomo Mexico, Ctr Invest Econ, Mexico City, DF, Mexico

[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA

[3] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2001年 / 100卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

evolution; information; learning; stochastic stability; repeated games;

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2001.2823

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving game, Overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game. They may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior Of their opponents. If the value of the.-ift is smaller than twice the cost, then gifts are not given. If the value of the gift is more than four times the cost, then gifts are exchanged. Moreover, in the stochastically stable equilibrium, a unique information system is selected to support cooperation. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

引用

页码：1 / 21

页数：21